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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

water met these criteria. The court of appeals believed the district
court viewed the EPA's approval of the Montana state permitting
system as an implicit grant of authority to Montana to amend the
CWA's permitting system, and admonished that belief stating, "only
Congress may amend the CWA to create exemptions from regulation."
Thus, the EPA cannot allow a state like Montana to create a CBM
exemption because the EPA cannot delegate to a state more power
than it has under the CWA.
Thus, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for
Fidelity and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment
for NPRC.
Dan Wennogle

State Eng'r v. S. Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians,
339 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that: (1) under the doctrine of
prior exclusive jurisdiction, federal district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over contempt action arising out of state water right
decree; (2) the McCarran Amendment applies to disputes involving
water rights acquired before its enactment; and (3) the McCarran
Amendment did not repeal the doctrine of prior exclusive
jurisdiction).
The controversy in this case arose over efforts by the State of
Nevada ("State") to administer a 1935 decree adjudicating water rights
on the Humboldt River ("Humboldt Decree"). The Humboldt Decree
defined water rights appurtenant to land purchased by the federal
government to create a reservation for the South Fork Band of the TeMoak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians ("Tribe"). The Tribe held
the right to use the water rights, while the federal government
retained fee ownership of the land. Initially, the federal government
paid county water right assessments on behalf of the Tribe, but ceased
doing so in 1997. The Tribe made payments for a short period, but
soon passed resolutions challenging the State's authority to administer
the river within its reservation, and eventually charged a state water
commissioner with trespass. After failing to persuade the Tribe to
rescind its resolutions, the State initiated contempt proceedings in
state court, alleging the Tribe violated the Humboldt Decree. The
United States joined as a necessary party and removed the action to
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada pursuant to
the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. The district court
concluded it possessed concurrent jurisdiction over the contempt
action, but abstained under Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States ("Colorado River"). The parties appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Both the Tribe and the
United States challenged the district court's abstention ruling; the
State challenged the district court's finding of concurrentjurisdiction.
As a threshold matter, the Ninth Circuit examined the question of

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 7

concurrentjurisdiction. The federal removal statute merely permitted
removal of an action to a federal district court; it did not establish that
court's jurisdiction or trump jurisdictional bars. Here, the Ninth
Circuit found a jurisdictional bar existed in the common law doctrine
of prior exclusive jurisdiction.
Rooted in principles of comity and avoiding piecemeal litigation,
the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction recognizes that separate
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over property at the same time.
Under the doctrine, once a court of competent jurisdiction obtains
possession, custody, or control of a particular property, another court
may not disturb that possession. The doctrine operates not as a
discretionary abstention rule, but as a mandatory jurisdictional
limitation. The Tribe and the United States argued the doctrine was
inapplicable on two bases: (1) that the underlying contempt actions
were in personam in nature, rather than in remn; and (2) under Colorado
River the McCarran Amendment ("Amendment") repealed the
doctrine in the arena of federal water rights.
Weighing first the argument that the contempt action was best
categorized as in personam in nature, the court observed that the
contempt action was brought to enforce a decree over a res, the
Humboldt River. In addition, the Tribe's property interest in the res
provided the state court's basis for jurisdiction. Also noting that the
Tribe's obstruction of water administration potentially affected other
users' property rights, the court characterized the contempt action as
quasi-in rem and found the doctrine fully applicable.
Next, the court turned to the question of concurrent jurisdiction.
Given that concurrent jurisdiction under ColoradoRiver relied upon an
interpretation of the Amendment, the court first considered whether
the Amendment applied retroactively to the Humboldt Decree.
Congress enacted the Amendment in 1952, but the Humboldt Decree
dated from 1935. Because the Amendment waives sovereign immunity
where the United States "is the owner" of water rights, and does not
state that it shall apply henceforth, the court held Congress intended
for the Amendment to apply retroactively. Moreover, the court noted
that applying the Amendment prospectively would impair state efforts
to adjudicate and administer water rights. Hence, the court held the
Amendment waived the United States' sovereign immunity in disputes
involving water rights acquired before its enactment.
Although finding the Amendment applicable, the court rejected
the United States' argument that under ColoradoRiver the Amendment
repealed the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. In the court's
view, Colorado River held that before a res is seized, both state and
federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over suits for the
determination of water rights of the United States, i.e., the
adjudication phase. Because the doctrine is only triggered after a
court seizes a res, and due to the presumption that statutes do not
overturn the common law unless stating so expressly, the court held
that the Amendment affirmed the doctrine, rather than repealed it.
Finding the doctrine fully applicable, and given the State's prior
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exercise ofjurisdiction over the Humboldt River, the court ruled that
the district court erred in concluding it possessed concurrent
jurisdiction over the contempt action. Thus, the court affirmed the
district court order remanding the case to state court, but on the basis
of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not abstention. In doing so, the
court also affirmed the primacy of state jurisdiction over matters
relating to water rights administration.
Arthur R. Kleven

United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 340 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that Nevada rules on forfeiture and abandonment did
not provide an exemption for interfarm transfers were not exempt
from, and conveyance of water in dirt lined ditches does not provide
the basis for a water right to the adjoining land).
This suit involved water rights granted under the Newlands
Reclamation Project ("Newlands Project"), withdrawn in 1903 under
the Reclamation Act of 1902 ("Act"), and intended for use irrigating
land in Nevada. The Newlands Project diverted water from the Carson
and Truckee Rivers and allowed landowners to use that water for
irrigation. However, this diversion reduced the water held in Pyramid
Lake, granted to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe ("Paiutes") as a part of
their reservation. During the 1980s, many Newlands Project water
rights holders applied to the Nevada state engineer for transfers to
change the place of use of their water rights. The Paiutes objected,
alleging the holders forfeited, abandoned, or failed to perfect their
rights. The Nevada state engineer granted all but seven of the transfer
applications, based on a finding that Nevada state law exempted
interfarm transfers of rights from abandonment or forfeiture by users,
and that application of water to a "beneficial use" includes conveying
that water through a dirt-lined supply ditch. The District Court for the
District of Nevada affirmed the findings of the state engineer. The
United States, the Paiutes, and three applicants appealed the district
court decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part
and reversed in part. It reversed the district court decision affirming
portions of the state engineer's opinion based on interfarm transfer
exemptions, and dirt-lined ditches constituting a beneficial use. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the portions of the district court decision
affirming the state engineer's use of substantial evidence for factual
findings regarding abandonment.
The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Nevada law exempted
interfarm transfers from state forfeiture and abandonment rules and
found that United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. controlled its
decision. In that case, the court held that Nevada state law created no
exemption from forfeiture or abandonment for interfarm transfers.
Finding an exemption would require the court to infer that the
government approved owners' transfer applications prior to

